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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : Case No. 20000707-CA 
ROBERT TODD BROWN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a guilty plea to one count of 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. By asking defendant to come over and talk to him, did 
the officer violate defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from an unreasonable seizure? 
Whether an encounter with the police constitutes a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment is a legal conclusion, reviewed for 
correctness. As with a reasonable suspicion determination, the 
trial court is accorded a "measure of discretion" in applying the 
standard. Salt Lake Citv v. Ray, 2000 UT App. 55, 1 8, 998 P.2d 
274 (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)). 
2. Should this Court review the scope of a search where 
defendant explicitly waived his right to appeal the matter as 
part of a favorable plea negotiation and where, as a result of 
the plea negotiation, the trial court never ruled on the matter? 
Where an issue has not been ruled upon by the trial court, 
no standard of review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of the single issue properly before the Court 
requires analysis of no constitutional provisions, statutes, or 
rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a first degree felony; 
one count of possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a 
second degree felony; and one count of possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor (R. 5-7) . The offenses all 
occurred within 1000 feet of a church and followed a previous 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Id. 
Following a preliminary hearing and bindover on all charges, 
defendant filed a motion to suppress (R. 26-32). After an 
evidentiary hearing on the motion, the trial court ruled that the 
initial stop was proper but that it would defer a decision on the 
scope of the search pending further briefing by the parties (R. 
57: 26-27) . Prior to any further ruling from the court, 
2 
defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to a single third 
degree felony, preserving his right to appeal only the legality 
of the initial stop (Id. at 28). This timely appeal followed (R. 
53-54) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In June of 1999, Officer James Gent of the Ogden City Police 
Department stopped a motorcycle in front of an apartment building 
because the vehicle's registration had expired (Tr. 5)-1 The 
driver, Rocco Colantonio, said he was test-driving the motorcycle 
and that the owner was in his apartment (Id. at 5, 13). Rocco's 
girlfriend then emerged from the apartment to see what was going 
on. She confirmed both Rocco1s identity and the presence of the 
owner in the apartment. She then went back inside to convey a 
request by the officer to speak to the owner about the expired 
registration (Id. at 6). A few minutes later, she returned and 
told the officer, "*[H]e won't come out. He doesn't want to talk 
to you'" (Id. at 7). The officer thought this was "kind of 
suspicious" (Id.). 
Minutes later, a few neighborhood eight-year-olds came 
running up to the officer and told him that "a white man in a 
blue t-shirt" had just jumped out of Rocco's apartment window and 
1
 The abbreviation, uTr.", refers to the preliminary 
hearing transcript of May 11, 2000, which has not been paginated 
for purposes of this appeal. 
3 
had taken off running (Id. at 7, 13) .2 The officer searched the 
area but could not locate the individual (R. 7). 
Two hours later, as Officer Gent was driving by the same 
apartment, he noticed a white man in a blue shirt knocking on the 
door of Rocco Colantonio's apartment (Id. at 7-8, 15). As the 
officer made a U-turn and came back to park, he saw the man, 
defendant, walk toward a parked vehicle. When the officer 
stopped and stepped from his marked police car, defendant uturned 
around and quickly went the other way" (Id. at 8). Officer Gent 
"called to him and asked him to come talk to me" (Id.). 
Defendant approached Officer Gent, who later testified that 
defendant "was just shaking. I could see sweat forming on his 
forehead. He was just very unusually nervous" (Id. at 9). 
Defendant held a large cardboard cup in his right hand, and he 
kept putting his left hand in his front pocket (Id.). Although 
the officer told him repeatedly to remove his hand from his 
pocket, defendant continued to put it back in. From this, the 
officer concluded that "there was obviously something in his 
pocket that he doesn't want me to know about or something that he 
needs to keep his hand on and that raised my suspicion and my 
2
 Suspecting the man who jumped from the apartment window 
was the owner of the motorcycle, the officer commented at the 
preliminary hearing, "I thought it was kind of unusual that 
someone would jump out the window instead of just coming out to 
talk to me" (Tr. 7). 
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concern for my safety" (Id.). The officer elaborated, "Well, he 
could have had a weapon in his pocket . . . and he's already got 
his hand on it. He's got the jump on me" (Id.). 
The officer explained to defendant that he was going to 
conduct a weapons search (Id.). In doing so, the officer felt 
money in defendant's pocket and then a hard square box which was 
ultimately found to contain both methamphetamines and marijuana 
(Tr. at 10, 17/ R. 57: 5). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant appears to argue that the trial court erred in 
determining that the officer's initial stop of defendant was a 
consensual encounter. The facts demonstrate, however, that the 
police officer merely called to defendant, asking him to "come 
talk to me" (Tr. at 8). The record demonstrates that the remark 
was uttered as a request. There is no evidence suggesting 
coercion. Under the circumstances, the trial court correctly 
determined that the stop did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. 
Further, even if the Court were to interpret the stop as a level 
two seizure, it was supported by reasonable suspicion. Two hours 
earlier, when the officer had tried to follow up on an expired 
motorcycle registration, the owner had refused to come out of an 
apartment to talk with him. Some children had then reported a 
white man in a blue shirt jumping out a window of the same 
apartment and running away. When the officer saw a man meeting 
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that description knocking on the same apartment door, he had 
reasonable suspicion to detain him for a brief investigation. As 
either a consensual level one encounter or a level two detention, 
then, the trial court properly determined that the officer was 
justified in stopping defendant. 
Additionally, defendant argues that the officers exceeded 
the scope of a proper search for weapons and that, consequently, 
all contraband seized as a result of the unconstitutional search 
should be suppressed. This argument fails at the outset because 
it is not properly before this Court for review. While defendant 
raised the issue in his suppression motion, he subsequently chose 
not to invoke a ruling on it for tactical reasons. By foregoing 
a ruling, he was able to negotiate a favorable plea bargain, 
which was specifically conditioned on preserving the right to 
challenge only the propriety of the initial stop. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED 
THAT DEFENDANT WAS SUBJECT TO A 
CONSENSUAL LEVEL ONE ENCOUNTER 
WHERE THE POLICE OFFICER MERELY 
ASKED DEFENDANT TO COME TALK TO 
HIM; ALTERNATIVELY, THE STOP COULD 
BE JUSTIFIED BASED ON REASONABLE 
SUSPICION 
Defendant appears to argue that the trial court erred in 
determining that Officer Gent's initial stop of defendant 
constituted a level one encounter. See Br. of App. at 9. To the 
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extent that defendant makes this argument, it must fail. 
In ruling on the initial stop, the trial court stated: 
I don't have any problems with this case 
insofar as the initial stop. A level one 
stop, complying with the law. I don't even 
have any problems with the fact that - that 
based on the description of this person and 
the - and his nervousness and his repeated 
efforts to put his hand in his pocket despite 
the officer telling him not to, that the 
officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion 
to detain him and to perform a weapons 
search. 
R. 57: 18. 
In light of the record facts, the trial court correctly 
ruled that the initial stop was a level one encounter. The law 
is well-settled that three levels of police encounters with the 
public are constitutionally permissible: 
"(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the 'detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed." 
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)(per 
curiam)(citations omitted). This Court has stated that a seizure 
for Fourth Amendment purposes does not occur during a level one 
encounter, "when a police officer merely approaches an individual 
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on the street and questions him, if the person is willing to 
listen." State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah App. 
1987)(citation omitted). A level one encounter is thus 
voluntary, where a citizen may respond to questions posed by an 
officer, but is nonetheless free to leave at any time. State v. 
Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App. 1990). 
In this case, the record evidence demonstrates that the 
initial stop of defendant was a level one consensual encounter. 
Officer Gent stated that he saw defendant at Rocco Colantonio's 
door and then made a U-turn and parked his patrol car (Tr. at 8). 
He testified, "I called to [defendant] and asked him to come talk 
to me" (Id.; accord id. at 15; R. 57: 4). Defendant then 
approached the officer (Id. at 9). 
At the suppression hearing, defense counsel explored the 
tone of voice used by the officer in asking defendant to "come 
talk." While the record cannot reflect the precise tenor of the 
remark, it does contain a compelling interpretive clue. On cross 
examination of Officer Gent, defense counsel stated, "Two hours 
later you saw the defendant wearing a blue t-shirt, Mr, 
Colantonio's front door, and based upon that, you - as he started 
walking away from you, you said, come here. I need to talk to 
you" (R. 57: 4). The officer responded, "Not exactly that way, 
but - I didn't use that tone of voice" (Id.). 
Later in the hearing, defendant argued that because Officer 
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Gent had "commanded" -- rather than "requested" -- defendant to 
talk with him, the encounter must necessarily be a level two 
detention, subject to the Fourth Amendment (Id. at 8). The trial 
court disagreed, stating, "But I don't think that's what Officer 
Gent just said. . . . He challenged the tone of your voice and he 
challenged the way that you even framed the word. . . " (Id. at 
8-9). Because the trial court was present to impartially judge 
the import of the officer's testimony, its determination should 
not be second-guessed by this Court on a cold appellate record. 
See, e.g., State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1240-41 (Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 
979 (1993). 
The record here thus indicates that Officer Gent merely 
requested defendant to talk with him. In addition, the record is 
devoid of any evidence suggesting that Officer Gent was 
accompanied by the threatening presence of other officers, or 
that he displayed a weapon, or used words or physical actions to 
compel defendant's presence. See Truiillo, 739 P.2d at 87 
(enumerating factors tending to indicate seizure has occurred); 
State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994). 
Factually, this case is quite similar to Deitman, where the 
officer "called to defendants and asked if he could speak to 
them. They responded by crossing the street to his vehicle and 
presented identification upon request." Deitman, 739 P.2d at 
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617. Defendants raised no objection to the officer's request, 
and the officer did not detain them against their will. Id. at 
618; accord Bountiful Citv v. Maestas. 788 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah 
App. 1990) • The supreme court determined"that the facts in 
Deitman gave rise to a level one consensual encounter and did not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. With an essentially 
identical fact pattern in this case, the result should be the 
same. 
Even if this Court were to interpret the stop as a level two 
seizure, however, it would nonetheless be justified by the 
officer's reasonable suspicion. The standard for initially 
detaining an individual in Utah has been codified: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999). See also State v. Menke, 787 
P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Carpena. 714 P.2d 674, 
675 (Utah 1986). In determining whether reasonable suspicion 
exists, courts look to "specific and articulable facts, together 
with rational inferences from those facts, which warrant the 
intrusion." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). If 
reasonable suspicion exists, the officer whas not only the right 
but the duty to make observations and investigations to determine 
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whether the law is being violated; and if so, to take such 
measures as are necessary in the enforcement of the law." State 
v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 105 (Utah 1980)(quoting State v. 
Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971 
(1977)) . 
In this case, the officer was trying to locate the owner of 
a motorcycle with lapsed registration. He was told, first, that 
the owner was inside an apartment and second, upon further 
inquiry, that the owner refused to come out and talk with him 
(Tr. 5 at 5, -7, 13). The officer thought the refusal was "kind 
of suspicious" (Id. at 7). Moments later, some children reported 
that a white man in a blue t-shirt had jumped from the apartment 
window and run away, an activity the officer described as 
"unusual" (Id. at 7, 13). Two hours later, the officer spotted a 
man matching the children's description knocking at the door of 
the same apartment (Id. at 7-8, 15). As soon as the man saw the 
uniformed officer, he "turned around and quickly went the other 
way" (II at 8) . 
From this constellation of facts, the officer could 
reasonably infer that the owner of the motorcycle was trying to 
avoid the police and that the white man in the blue t-shirt who 
jumped from the apartment window was both the owner of the 
motorcycle and same person the officer saw knocking at the door 
two hours later. Under these circumstances, the office had 
11 
sufficient justification to stop defendant to at least ascertain 
his identity and whether he was the owner of the motorcycle- No 
more is necessary to justify a brief investigatory detention 
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. 
Thus, whether the initial stop of defendant was a consensual 
level one encounter or a level two detention, this Court should 
sustain the trial court's ruling. 
POINT TWO 
WHERE DEFENDANT EXPLICITLY WAIVED 
HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL THE SCOPE OF 
THE WEAPONS SEARCH AS PART OF HIS 
PLEA NEGOTIATION AND WHERE TOE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT RULE ON THE 
SCOPE OF THE SEARCH, THAT ISSUE IS 
NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
Defendant argues that Officer Gent exceeded the proper scope 
of a weapons search. Accordingly, he contends, the search 
violated the Fourth Amendment, the contrabatnd that the officer 
ultimately found should have been suppressed, and defendant 
should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and decide anew 
whether or not he wishes to enter a plea (Br. of App. at 9, 14-
15) . 
Defendant's argument is not properly before this Court. 
After the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, the trial 
court ruled that the initial stop by Officer Gent was a 
consensual level one encounter (R. 57s 18). Expressing concern 
about the scope of the subsequent weapons search, however, the 
12 
trial court postponed a decision on that issue until it could 
review the matter further (Id. at 23, 26) . 
Two weeks later, the case was back on the court's calendar. 
Substitute defense counsel opened the hearing by stating: 
It's my understanding that there has been a 
suppression motion . . . The court has ruled 
on the issue of the stop . . . and you found 
that the stop was proper. It's my 
understanding that you had some other issues 
[sic] that there's a briefing schedule for. 
As a result of that, we've arrived at a 
negotiation. [Defendant] is going to enter a 
plea of guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, and the 
other counts will be dismissed. We are 
reserving the right to appeal your finding 
with regard to the stop. 
R. 57: 28. The prosecutor explained further that review of the 
preliminary hearing tape had revealed ambiguity in certain 
pivotal evidence concerning the search, thus prompting the State 
to negotiate a plea with defendant (Id. at 29). Later in the 
hearing, in the course of the plea colloquy, the following 
exchange occurred: 
The Court: Do you understand that any 
appeal that you file after 
today with the exception of 
one that has been referenced 
in the plea bargain would be 
very limited in scope. In 
other words, there's not much 
to appeal from on a plea of 
guilty? 
Def. Counsel: Except that we are reserving 
the right to appeal that one 
issue. 
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Defendant: Yes. 
The Court 
Prosecution: 
The Court: 
Prosecution: 
The Court: 
As I understand, there is the 
issue of whether there was a 
proper level one stop, is 
that what I understood was the 
negotiation? 
That's correct, Your Honor. 
You ruled in the alternative 
that either it was a proper 
level one stop or that there 
was a reasonable suspicion for 
the stop based on the 
circumstances. 
Okay. 
And in my mind, that's the 
issues [sic] that - that they 
have a right to appeal. 
Very well. Is that clear in 
your mind? 
Defendant: Yes, Your Honor. 
Id. at 31. Based on this understanding, defendant entered a plea 
of guilty to one third-degree felony. Id. at 34. 
The law is well-settled that where a trial court does not 
rule on a defense motion and defendant fails to invoke a ruling, 
defendant waives the issue for purposes of appeal. State v. 
Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied 795 P.2d 
1138 (Utah 1990). Here, defendant did not invoke a ruling on the 
scope of the search as raised in his suppression motion for a 
tactical reason. By foregoing a ruling on the matter, he was 
able to negotiate a favorable plea with the State. 
Indeed, defendant explicitly waived his right to appeal the 
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scope of the weapons search as part of the plea negotiation. 
Under such circumstances, where defendant's strategy is plain on 
its face and well-documented by the record, there can be no doubt 
that defendant waived any challenge to the weapons search and 
that the only issue properly preserved for appellate review is 
the propriety of the initial stop. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
third degree felony conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this decision rests wholly on well-established law 
and a formal opinion will add nothing new to the case law, the 
state requests neither oral argument nor a published opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this oil day of November, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
15 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage 
prepaid, to Maurice Richards, Weber County Public Defenders 
Association, 2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 102, Ogden Utah 84401, 
this <2T day of November, 2000. 
tiff MM/ ( 
16 
